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NOTE
"LEGAL" SECONDARY BOYCOTTS: EFFECT OF TIlE
GENERAL DEFINITIONS SECTION OF THE TAFT-
HARTLEY _.tT ON THE SECONDARY
BOYCOTT SECTION
INTRODUCTION
Section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides in part
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents-
"(4) to induce the employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to handle or work on any goods where an
object thereof is (A) forcing any employer or other person
to cease doing business with any other person. ,, (empha-
sis added.)
Thus, section 8(b) (4) (A) makes the secondary boycott an un-
fair labor practice if the statutory provisions are violated. However,
these statutory provisions are violated only when a labor organiza-
tion induces the "employees of any employer," and then only if an
object of the inducement is to force "any employer or other person"
to cease doing business with any other person. Since the passing
of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, a confusing and contradictory body
of case law has developed on the question of what constitutes
an "employer" or an "employee" within the meaning of section
8(b) (4))(A) This confusion has been the result of disputes as
to whether the general definitions in section 2(2) and (3) of the
act are determinative of the meaning of the words "employer" and
"employee" as used in section 8(b) (4) (A)
Section 2 provides that when used in the act
"(2) The term 'employer' shall not include the United
States or any State or political subdivision thereof, or
any person subject to the Railway Labor Act.
"(3) The term 'employee' shall not include any indi-
vidual employed as an agricultural laborer or any individual
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act
or by any other person who is not an employer as herein de-
fined." 2
The National Labor Relations Board3 has consistently held that
these definitions apply to section 8(b) (4) (A) as well as to any
1. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as added by
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1952) (herein referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act).
2. 49 Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) and (3) (1952).
3. Herein referred to as the NLRB or as the Board.
other part of the act. Under -this interpretation and in the case of
first impression 4 on the question, the NLRB held that employees
of a railroad may be lawfully induced to strike in what would other-
wise be an illegal secondary boycott, for the reason that the rail-
road is not an "employer" within section 8(b) (4) (A) and there-
fore the protection of that section does not extend to it. On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
a railroad is an "employer" within the meaning of section
8(b) (4) (A) notwithstanding the specific exclusion of section
2(2) ; therefore, inducement of railroad employees contrary to the
prohibitions of section 8(b) (4) (A) is an illegal secondary boy-
cott.5 Both the interpretation of the NLRB and that of the court
of appeals purported to be grounded in the plain words of the
statute, in the legislative history of the statute and in desirable
public policy. Thus was raised a problem which has yet to be
solved, for the NLRB has refused to follow the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals and has continued to hold that the parties specifically
excluded by section 2(2) and (3) are not "employers" or "em-
ployees" for purposes of section 8(b) (4) (A). These holdings have
resulted in secondary activities which might be referred to as "legal
secondary boycotts."
This problem is one of major import in the field of labor law
since railroads, federal and state governments, or agricultural pro-
ducers are potential secondary parties to almost every labor dispute
which might arise. Whether they can be secondarily picketed without
violating the secondary boycott provision of the Taft-Hartley Act
is a question of great strategic significance to unions and employers.
Since extensive secondary picketing of these groups would sub-
stantially affect the flow of interstate commerce, it is also a ques-
tion of great social and economic significance to the nation as a
whole. The purpose of this Note is to examine the question and to
evaluate the answers which the NLRB and the courts have given
to it.
PART I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAsE LAW
A. Rice Milling: the first impression--
'The first published opinion construing the effect of the general
definitions section of the Taft-Hartley Act on the secondary boy-
4. Teamsters Union, Local 201, AFL, and International Rice Milling
Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 360 (1949).
5. International Rice Milling Co. v. NLRB, 183 F2d 21 (5th Cir. 1950),
rievd on other groundt, 341 U.S. 665 (1951), 35 Minn. L. Rev. 215 (dis-
cussing another issue m the case).
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cott section was the intermediate report of the NLRB trial examiner
in the Internatwnal Rice Milling Co. case.6 In that case the Team-
ster's Union was engaged in a primary dispute with the Interna-
tional Rice Milling Company There was no doubt that both the
union and the primary employer were covered by the Taft-Hartley
Act. The secondary employers were the Missouri Pacific and South-
ern Pacific Railroads which had tracks running onto the primary
employer's premises. Through threats and overtures of violence,
the union induced the railroad employees to cease bringing trains
onto the primary employer's premises with an object of forcing the
railroad to cease doing business with the primary employer. Inter-
national Rice Milling Co. filed unfair labor practice charges with
the NLRB, the Board issued a complaint based on the charges,
and the trial examiner was called upon to advise the Board whether
this activity constituted a violation of section 8(b) (4) (A) In his
report the trial examiner considered the plain words of the statute.
its legislative history, and policy factors, and concluded that. when
the Teamsters induced the railroad employees to strike with an
object of forcing the railroad to cease doing business with the Rice
Milling Company, it was engaging in an illegal secondary boycott
under section 8(b) (4) (A) though both the railroad employees and
employer are specifically excluded from the general definition of
"employer" and "employee" in section 2(2) and (3) of the act.
Plain words of the statute-The trial examiner argued that
generally in section 8 of the act the word "employer" is preceded
by the indefinite article "an" or by the definite article "the," while
in subsection (4) of section 8(b) the modifying adjective "any"
preceded the word "employer." The inference drawn from this
variation was that in section 8(b) (4) (A) the word "employer"
was used in its generic sense so as to include all employers in fact,
and not merely those within the section 2(2) definition. If this were
not so, the trial examiner reasoned, subsection (4) of section 8(b)
would modify "employer" with "an" and "the" as is done in
the rest of section 8 of the act, rather than with the all-inclusive
adjective "any" If the railroad qualifies under this interpretation
of "any employer" then its employees are "employees of any em-
ployer" and both the inducement of the employees and the object
of forcing their employer are prohibited by section 8(b) (4) (A)
The trial examiner made a second analytical attack on the
troublesome words. He stated that part (A) of subsection (4) uses
the words "forcing any employer or other person," and that
6. 84 N.L.R.B. at 362
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the section 2(1) definition of "person" is broad enough to include
railroads. It was reasoned that the words "any employer" in the
introductory portion of subsection (4) and the words "any em-
ployer or other person" in part (A) of subsection (4) refer to the
same employer and therefore the broader words of part (A) are
construed as a controlling modification of the quoted introductory
words; so the introduction really means, "to induce ... the em-
ployees of any employer [or other person]." Since the railroad is
a "person" within the act, the secondary boycott provision applies
to it notwithstanding the exclusions of section 2(2) and (3)
Legislative history of the statute-The trial examiner found that
there was no legislative history which directly indicated that the
specific exclusions of section 2(2) and (3) were not meant to be
applied to section 8(b) (4) (A). On the other hand, he found no
legislative history which directly indicated that the exclusions were
meant to be so applied. He argued that the prime reason for exclud-
ing railroads from the definition of "employer" was to make it clear
that it was not intended that the Taft-Hartley Act should regulate
the primary employer-employee relationships of railroads, which
had long been satisfactorily handled by the Railway Labor Act.-
The trial examiner reasoned that it did not necessarily follow that
Congress intended to deprive railroads and their employees of the
protection of the secondary boycott provisions of the Taft-Hartley
Act when there was ito primary dispute which might be controlled
by the Railway Labor Act. In effect, it was reasoned that while
the Taft-Hartley Act was not meant to put additional controls on
railroads, there is no indication that it was meant to deprive them
of the rights that employers generally have, particularly when no
regulation of the interiul labor relations of railroads was involved.
Policy factors-The trial examiner argued that possibly no in-
dustry is more concerned with commerce than the railroad industry
and that to exclude this major medium of commerce from the pro-
tection of section 8 (b) (4) (A) would create an "illogical luatus" in
the law. Thus, secondary activity directed toward employers
included by the general definitions section of the act would con-
stitute an unfair labor practice, but similar activity directed toward
railroads which are excluded by the general definitions section
would not be an unfair labor practice. The trial examiner felt that
such an interpretation would result in "an effect on commerce
antipodal to that intended by Congress.""
7. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1952).
8. 84 N.L.R.B. at 375.
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When the Rice Milling case came before the NLRB it was held
that there was no violation of section 8(b) (4) (A) because the
general definitions of section 2(2) and (3) control, and railroads
are, therefore, not employers within section 8(b) (4) (A) Further,
the railroad workers are not employees within section 8(b) (4) (A)
The Board stated that Congress had historically accorded railroads
separate treatment and that the separate treatment ought to be pre-
served in this instance. It also pointed out that while the section 2(2)
exclusion of railroads from the definition of "employer" was a
holdover from the Wagner Act,' the section 2(3) exclusion of rail-
road employees from the definition of "employee" was added by
the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 This appeared to the Board to con-
stitute a sort of reaffirmation of the congressional intent to accord
railroads separate treatment. The Board did not recognize or discuss
the trial examiner's proposition that this exclusion of railroads was
to preserve for the Railway Labor Act the regulation of their
printary relations with their employees and not to expose em-
ployers to secondary pressures from which employers generally are
protected by section 8(b) (4) (A) Also the specific exclusion of
railroad employees in 1947 might be explained in another way In
1947 Congress added a whole new provision to the NLRA, in which
it set out for the first time certain unfair labor practices of unions.
These unfair labor practices were more or less correlative to those
of employers which were set out in section 8(a) as a carry over
from the Wagner Act. Since Congress in 1935 had specifically ex-
cluded railroad employers from the definition of "employer" so
that railroad unions could not use the Wagner Act in their primary
disputes with railroad employers, Congress may have felt that
equality of treatment between railroad employers and employees
demanded that when it set out certain unfair labor practices of
unions in section 8(b) in 1947 it should likewise specifically ex-
clude railroad employees from the definition of "employee." Then
a railroad employer could not use the new provisions of the act
against a union when the union was precluded from using the old
provisions of the act against the employer. However, it should be
noted that this consideration relates only to the parties' primary
relations with each other and not to the secondary activities directed
against both of them by an unconnected labor organization, which
might arise under section 8(b) (4) (A) In its brief decision the
Board made no analysis of the problem other than summarily to
9. National Labor Relations Act, 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67
(1952).
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state the two propositions set out above. It did not refute or even
recognize the exhaustive analysis of the trial examiner.
When the Rice Milling case was appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 0 that court reversed the
NLRB and adopted almost verbatim the opinion of the trial
examiner as set out in his intermediate report. Thus the reasoning
which the Board had apparently not considered important enough
to discuss was used by the higher tribunal to support the overruling
of the Board decision. But as its subsequent decisions were to indi-
cate, the Board was not convinced by the Fifth Circuit Court's
opinion.
B. Al T. Schneider Co.; Spry v Electric Co.. the NLRB defends its
interpretation-
In the Al I. Schneider Co. case' L a public school board engaged
the named company as a general contractor to undertake a construc-
tion project. A primary dispute arose between the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and Employer X, another con-
tractor on the same project. The IBEW induced the employees of
Al J. Schneider Co. to strike with an object of forcing the public
school board to cease doing business with Employer X. There was
no doubt that Al J. Schneider Co., Employer X, and the IBEW
were covered by the Taft-Hartley Act. Consequently, the activities
of the IBEW constituted inducement of the "employees of any em-
ployer" within section 8(b) (4) (A) The NLRB held that a public
school board is a political subdivision of a state and, therefore, ex-
cluded from the section 2(2) definition of "employer." It also held
that the school board was not a "person" within section 2(1). The
general definitions of section 2 control the meaning of "employer"
and "person"' within section 8(b) (4) (A) and therefore the induce-
ment was not with an object of forcing "any employer or other
person" to cease doing business with Employer X. Consequently,
the secondary activity was not a violation of section 8(b) (4) (A).
Here the first requisite of section 8(b) (4) (A)-the inducement
element-had been satisfied, but the second requisite-the object
element-had not.
The Fifth Circuit Court in the Rice Milling case had argued that
a railroad excluded as an "employer" by section 2(2) was neverthe-
less a "person" within section 2(1). The main argument of the
NLRB in the instant case was that a subdivision of a state govern-
10. See note 5 .supra.
11. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 16, AFL,




ment, excluded as an employer by section 2(2), is not a "person"
within section 2(1) The NLRB reasoned that since section 2(1)
expressly enumerated so many artificial entities as "persons" for the
purposes of the act, then by a sort of negative implication state
government must not be one, else it would have been expressly
enumerated also.
Further, it argued that the interpretation that a state govern-
ment is a "person" would throw section 10(b) of the act into con-
flict with section 8(a) Section 10(b) provides that any "person"
may charge a labor organization with an unfair labor practice while
section 8(a) provides that certain acts constitute unfair labor prac-
tices if they are committed by "an employer." To construe state
government to be a "person" but not an "employer" would mean
that it could file a charge against a labor organization if that labor
organization violated section 8(b), but the government agency
could never be effectively charged with an unfair labor practice
itself because "persons" who are not also "employers" cannot be
guilty of an unfair labor practice under section 8(2) Since section
8(a) cannot be used to impose duties on "persons" who are not
"employers," the NLRB felt that section 8(b) (4) (A) should not
be construed to give rights to "persons" who are not "employers."
To do so would be to violate "the scheme and policy of the Act,
founded upon a structure of correlative rights and duties. "12
The Board's final argument to support its position that a state
government subdivision is not a "person" was a resort to legislative
history After the adoption of the Wagner Act, in which section
2(1) read exactly as it does now, Senator Wagner introduced an
amendment to section 2(1) which would have specifically included
government agencies as "persons." Since Congress did not adopt
this amendment and did not revive the consideration at the time
the Taft-Hartley Act was debated, the Board thought it should
be inferred that there was a considered design not to include the
government as a "person."' 3
In the Sprys Electric Co. case,' 4 analogous on its facts to the
Schneider Co. case, the NLRB first expressly recognized the ad-
verse decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Rice
Milling case. The Board stated that with due respect for the opinion
of that court, it would rely on its reasoning in the Schneider case
and hold exactly to the contrary Now to clinch the split of authority
12. 89 N.L.R.B. at 224.
3. 89 N.L.R.B. at 225.
14. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 5, AFL.
and Sprys Electric Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1953).
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it was only needed that some other circuit court decide in accord-
ance with the NLRB. That is exactly what happened.
C. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp.. the confusion is compounded-
In the Di Giorgio case 5 there was a primary strike for recogni-
tion by an agricultural laborers' union against an agricultural
producer. The union induced the employees of a grocery store and
a food processing plant to strike with an object of forcing their
employers to cease doing business with the argicultural producer.
The NLRB held that the agricultural laborers' union did not
violate section 8(b) (4) (A) because section 8 of the act proscribes
secondary boycotts only when perpetrated by a "labor organization."
Section 2(5) defines a "labor organization" as one in which "em-
ployees participate." Since agricultural laborers are not employees
within section 2(3), their union is not a "labor organization" capa-
ble of violating section 8. Here the inducement and object elements
of section 8(b) (4) (A) were both satisfied but the perpetrator of
the inducement was not subject to the prohibition of section 8.
The NLRB then held that the unions at the grocery store and the
food processing plant which observed the secondary picket lines did
violate section 8(b) (4) (A). The basis of this holding was that
the unions induced their member employees to cease handling
Di Giorgio products in response to the secondary picket line. This
inducement was with an object of forcing their employer to cease
doing business with Di Giorgio, thus bringing the activity within
the proscription of section 8(b) (4) (A). The Board wrote no
opinion of its own, but adopted the trial examiner's reasoning"
"The Act does indeed produce the curious result that unions
of 'employees' may call upon fellow unions to aid m forcing
recognition pursuant to a certification and that the labor organ-
izations which respond are free from prosecution under the Act,
while those labor organizations which respond to the appeals
of unions of agricultural laborers for aid in achieving recognition
may be prosecuted for doing so, although the agricultural unions
themselves are not subject to prosecution. However odd the
result, the dictate of the statute is clear."' 0 (Emphasis added.)
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia affirmed the decision of the NLRB." The court
adopted a Board argument that it would be unfair to place the re-
strictions of section 8(b) on agricultural laborors' unions when
15. Teamsters Union, Local 87, AFL and Di Giorgio Wine Co., 87
N.L.R.B. 720 (1949).
16. 87 N.L.R.B. at 749.
17. Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S 869 (1951)
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they were excluded from receiving the correlative benefits of sec-
tion 8(a) of the act. This argument assumes that if the union is
considered a "labor organization" for purposes of subsection 4(A)
and (B) of section 8(b), it must also be considered as a "labor
organization" for all purposes under section 8(b) That is, the
court feels that for the sake of consistency in interpreting the words
of the act, secondary activity of unions cannot be regulated without
also regulating primary activities. This reasoning, that inclusion
for one purpose is inclusion for all purposes, is also found in the
opinion of the NLRB in the Schneider case."8 Once this first
premise is established, it is then reasoned that the resultant restric-
tions on unions, while their employers are excluded from regulation,
violates a policy of mutual benefits and burdens of both employer
and employees which the act contemplates.
Beyond this the court relied on the plain meaning of the words
of the statute, as the Board has always done. At the end of its
opinion the court rationalized that the ultimate problem was for
Congress- The court said it could not determine what ought to
be done, it could only interpret what had been done. This inter-
pretation, however, did not include any mention of what had been
done in the Fifth Circuit decision in the Rice Milling case, which
had been a part of the case law for one year and stood as the only
court authority on the question.
D. The "piggy-back" case- the Supreme Court considers
the question-
In the "piggy-back" case"' an over-the-road carrier was engaged
in the practice of detaching its loaded semi-trailers from their cabs
and shipping them via railroad flat car to diverse points where
they were again picked up by cabs and hauled over the road. The
reason for this practice was economy of operation and it was re-
ferred to as "piggybacking ;-2o hence, the popular case name. The
Teamsters Union, which had a collective bargaining agreement with
the carrier, objected to this practice because it resulted in loss of
work to the union drivers. The union was engaged in a primary
strike against the carrier and pursuant to that strike induced
railroad employees to cease loading the trailers onto flatcars. The
object was to force the railroad company to cease doing business
with the primary employer. Thus, the facts were on all fours with
18 89 N.L.R.B. at 224.
19. Teamsters Union, Local 25, AFL v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 350
U.S. 155, rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 977 (1956).
20. This practice is becoming a matter of some concern in the trans-
portation industry. See Time, December 10, 1956, p. 94.
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those in the Rice Milling case and similar to those in the Schneider
and Sprys cases.
The railroad asked a Massachusetts state court to take jurisdic-
tion on the ground that the NLRB decisions in the above cases
indicated that the NLRB had decided that it did not have jurisdic-
tion to act since a railroad was not an employer within section
8(b) (4) (A) and, therefore, was not entitled to protection under
that section. The railroad reasoned that if the NLRB by its own
decision did not have jurisdiction, the state court was free to act.2'
The state court agreed with the argument, took jurisdiction and
enjoined the union's picketing of the railroad as an illegal secondary
boycott. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed this decision==
and the union appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the
jurisdiction question.
The Supreme Court stated-
"Under the Board's Rules and Regulations such a charge
may be filed by 'any person.' We think it clear that Congress in
excluding 'any person subject to the Railway Labor Act' from
the statutory definition of 'employer,' carved out of the Labor
Management Relations Act the railroads' employer-employee
relationships which were, and are, governed by the Railway
Labor Act. But we do not think that by so doing Congress
intended to divest the N.L.R.B. of jurisdiction over contro-
versies otherwise within its competence solely because a rail-
road is the complaimng party. Furthermore, since railroads are
not excluded from the Act's definition of 'person' they arc
entitled to Board protection from the kind of unfair labor prac-
tice proscribed by § 8(b) (4) (A)." (emphasis added.)23
It was held that the Board's jurisdiction over this case was exclu-
sive and the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Court was
reversed.
It might appear that the Supreme Court had laid the problem
to rest. But it was soon to be seen that the NLRB did not think so.
21. This raises the complicated problem of the applicability of the federal
pre-emption doctrine. Where the NLRB declines, as a matter of discretion,
to exercise its jurisdiction to the full extent provided in the act, it is not clear
that state courts may act. See Lab. Rel. Expediter, 312e. The issue is pend-
ing decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Garmon v.
San Diego Building Trades Council, 45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P.2d 1 (1955), 41
Minn. L. Rev. 131 (1956), cert. granted, 351 U.S. 923 (1956), argued, Janu-
ary 16, 1957. See 25 U.S.L. Week 3209 (January 22, 1957). But where the
NLRB declines to exercise jurisdiction because the activity is supposedly not
witlun the scope of the act, as in the instant group of cases, there is no ap-
parent reason for preventing state action. For the most current general sum-
mary and analysis of NLRB jurisdictional problems, see Lab. Rd. Expediter,
309-14.
22. New York, N.H. & H.RR. v. Jenkins, 331 Mass. 72-0, 122 N.E2d
759 (1954).
23. 350 U.S. at 160.
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E. Paper Makers Importig Co.. a reafirmatton of the
NLRB position-
The Paper Makers case24 grew out of the long dispute between
the United Automobile Workers and the Kohler Company of
Kohler, Wisconsin. The City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a municipal
corporation, owns and operates the docks at the Port of Milwau-
kee. The dock workers are represented by Local 2, American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. A ship
loaded with raw materials consigned to Paper Makers Importing
Company and destined for the Kohler Company docked at the
Port of Milwaukee. The UAW and Local 2 induced the dock em-
ployees of the City of Milwaukee not to unload the ship, with an
object of forcing Paper Markers and the City of Milwaukee to cease
doing business with Kohler Company
All the facts were stipulated and all procedures preliminary to
a Board decision were waived with the understanding that the
decision could be made on the stipulated facts. The Board stated in
its decision that the parties appeared to agree that the unions' con-
duct would constitute a violation of section 8(b) (4) (A) if the dock
workers of the City of Milwaukee were "employees of any em-
ployer" within the meaning of section 8(b) (4) (A) A more clear
cut presentation of the issue could hardly be imagined.
The Board, in its first really comprehensive opinion on the issue,
made an exhaustive analysis of the words of the statute, its legisla-
tive history, the arguments of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in the Rice Milling case, all the prior Board decisions on the ques-
tion, and the Supreme Court decision in .the "piggy-back" case.
Then the Board decided, as it always had before, that the definitions
of section 2(3) and (3) control the meaning of the words used in sec-
tion 8(b) (4) (A) Since a municipal corporation is excluded from
the section 2(2) definition of "employer," its employees are like-
wise excluded from the section 2(3) definition of "employee;"
and secondary inducement of those employees is not an illegal
secondary boybott under section 8(b) (4) (A) This decision stands
as the most recent development in the case law on the problem. 20
24. Local 833, United Automobile Workers, UAW-AFL-CIO, and
Paper Makers Importing Co., 116 N.L.R.B. No. 37, Lab. Rel. Rep. (38
L.R.R.M. 1228) (1956)
25. The Paper Makers case was cited in Local 327, Teamsters Union
and B & S Motor Lines, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. No. 117, Lab. Rel. Rep. (38
L.R.R.M. 1372) (1956) (holding independent contractors, excluded by § 2(3),
are not "employees" within § 8(b) (4) (A)). However, since the NLRB made
little analysis of the instant problem, the case is not helpful to this discussion.
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PART II. ANALYSIS OF THE ARGuMENTS
A. Arguments from the plain words of the statute:
(1) Interpretations based on common mwanings of the words-
Proponents on either side of the disilute claim that the problem can
be solved by reading the plain words of the statute. This was the
first argument made by the trial examiner in the Rice Milling case,
and it was adopted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:
"Contrasting the usage of the word 'any,' as found in subsection
(4), with the use of the indefinite article 'an,' as used elsewhere
in the section, gives rise to the inference, we think, that Con-
gress intended the word 'any' to embrace the class of employers
as a whole, and not merely those within the definition of em-
ployer,' as set forth in Section 2(2) of the Act."20
To this argument, the NLRB, in the Paper Makers case, re-
plied:
"We cannot agree that the use of the 'any' preceding the
word 'employer' in Section 8(b) (4) (A) has the significance
attributed to it by the... Court of Appeals in the Rice Milling
case. 'Any' is an adjective which means one indifferently out of
a number. It is customarily considered to be synonymous with
the indefinite articles 'a' and 'an.' . . Indeed the conference
report describing the operation of the new Section 8(b) (4) of
the Taft-Hartley bill uses 'an' and 'any' interchangeably, thus
following the dictionary meaning of 'any.'2 7
"Congress has said explicitly that 'when used in this Act'
the terms 'employer' and 'employee' shall have the meanings set
out in Section 2(2) and 2(3), respectively. Congress has not
said that the definitions contained in Section 2 were not to be
applied to Section 8(b) (4) (A). If that had been its intent, it
could easily have indicated as much by adding 'except in Sec-
tion 8(b) (4) (A)' to the phrase 'When used in this Act.' That
Congress did not utilize this simple device is persuasive evi-
dence that it intended the definitions set forth in Section 2 to
be applied throughout the Act without qualification or excep-
tion."ss
A sort of surrebutter to this is provided by the dissenting opinion in
the Paper Makers case. It finds the dictionary definition of the word
"any" to be, "indiscriminately of whatever kind. . wuchever one
chance may select. . with the implication that everyone is open
to selection without exception... every .. indicating the maximum
all; ... the whole .... "29
26. 183 F.2d at 25.
27. 38 L.R!kM. at 1229-30. The NLRB relies on Funk and Wagnalls,
New Standard Dictionary at 127 (1952).
28. 38 L.R.R.M. at 1229.
29. 38 L.R.R.M. at 1233-34 n. 29. The dissenting opunon relies on
Webster's New International Dictionary 121 (2d ed. 1947).
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It is difficult to say whether one dictionary definition of "any"
is better than another. This battle of the dictionaries is inconclu-
sive. 30 It is also difficult to say whether the use of the word "any"
in section 8(b) (4) (A) indicates any particular Congressional in-
tent, or whether the failure to provide for an exception to the exclu-
sions in section 2(2) and (3) indicates an opposite intent. One
argument seems as logical as the other. However, it might be noted
that it is of no avail to interpret "any" broadly ii order to include
an otherwise excluded employer within the purview of section
8(b) (4) (A) unless his employees are included also. Since sec-
tion 8(b) (4) requires the inducement to be of "the employees,"
specifically excluded employees such as railroad workers would not
be brought within the purview of section 8(b) (4) (A) and induce-
ment of them would not constitute a secondary boycott whether
or not "any" is given a broad interpretation so as to cover the
otherwise excluded employer. If Congress had intended to make
section 8(b) (4) (A) applicable to otherwise excluded employers
through use of the word "any" rather than "the," it would seem
that it would also have used the word "any" rather than "the"
to modify "employees" so that the inducement element as well as
the object element of the secondary boycott provision would have
been satisfied. Perhaps the failure of Congress to do this indicates
that it did not consider the problem at all when it drew the two
conflicting sections.
(2) Interpretations based on inference from other provisions of
the act-A second technique of arguing from the plain words of
the statute has been to point out the logical meaning of section
8(b) (4) (A) as it is read in conjunction with the rest of the act.
Thus proponents of the broad interpretation of "any" could argue
that although section 2(3) excludes certain groups from the defini-
tion of employee, that section specifically includes anyone whose
work has ceased because of a labor dispute. Therefore, excluded
groups, such as agricultural laborers, who have been induced to
cease work with an object of creating a secondary boycott are
specifically made "employees." It is reasoned that the inclusive
language qualifies the exclusive language.3 '
However, this argument can be refuted. Section 2(3), insofar
as pertinent to the argument, provides that, "The term 'employee'
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a con-
30. For a summary of the many possible meanings of "any," see C.J.S.
Any (1936).
31. See the Di Giorgio case, 191 F.2d at 648.
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sequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute ..
but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer. . ."32It seems more logical to argue that the exclusive
language which appears in the latter part of the sentence qualifies
the inclusive language which precedes it, rather than vice versa as
the above argument suggests. Further, if the suggested interpreta-
tion were adopted, it would result in including all the excluded em-
ployees for all purposes under the act and not merely for the
purpose of regulating secondary boycotts. This interpretation would
give no effect whatever to the exclusive lenguage of section 2(3)
if the employee's work had ceased because of a labor dispute, and
the NLRB would be required to regulate even primary employer-
employee relations of farmers, for example. The argument was
rejected by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as being
too contradictory of terms.33
A second argument of this kind is based on inference from
section 303 of the act,34 which gives "wiwever shall be injured" by
activity proscribed by section 8(b) (4) (A) a right to bring a civil
suit for damages. It is reasoned that section 8(b) (4) (A) and
section 303 are meant to refer to exactly the same type of activity
and that the broad words, "whoever shall be injured," used in sec-
tion 303 must mean that section 8(b) (4) (A) was meant to be
read as applying to all employers and employees in the generic
sense of the words.35
The trouble with this argument is that it begs the fundamental
question. True, "whoever shall be injured" may sue, but only when
he is injured as a result of violation of the secondary boycott pro-
visions of the act. The provisions of the act have been violated only
when "employees" have been induced with an object of forcing
"employers." Thus it is not known whether one has been injured
until it is first determined who are "employees" and "employers."
And that is the determination which the "whoever has been in-
jured" language is supposed to help make. The reasoning is com-
pletely circuitous. It was rejected by the majority in the Paper
Makers case. -3 6
Arguments of a similar nature have been made by proponents
of the narrow construction of "any." Thus the majority in the
32. 49 Stat. 45) (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C § 152(3) (1952).
33. 191 F.2d at 648.
34. 49 Stat 449 (1935), as added by 61 Stat. 158-59 (1947), 29 U.S.C.§ 187 (1952).
35. See the dissenting opinion in the Paper Makers case, 38 L.RLIM.
at 1234.
36. 38 L.R1R.M. at 1232.
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Paper Makers case points out that if the Fifth Circuit Court's inter-
pretation of "any" were adopted it would mean that the excluded
groups were "employees" and "employers" for purposes not only
of parts (A) and (B) of section 8(b) (4) but also of part (D) 37
Part (D) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to force
"any employer" to aid it in a work jurisdictional dispute. It is
argued that this interpretation would require the NLRB to step
in to settle railroad work jurisdictional disputes as well as secondary
boycotts involving railroads. If the Board were to do such a thing
it would be completely intermeshed with the controls of the Rail-
way Labor Act, since that act has its own provision for settling
railroad work jurisdictional disputes. 8 The NLRB would then
find itself regulating disputes which have been clearly shown not
to be within the purview of the Taft-Hartley Act. To avoid this
dilemma is apparently considered good enough reason to interpret
"any," as used in section 8(b) (4), narrowly and thereby steer clear
of railroads altogether.
One answer to this argument is suggested by the dissent in the
Paper Makers case. 39 It is founded on the hypothesis that before
the NLRB can determine whether section 8(b) (4) has been
violated it must first find grounds for asserting jurisdiction over the
parties. In all the secondary boycott cases relevant to the problem
under consideration, the NLRB has had jurisdiction over either
the primary40 or the secondary4' employer. If there were a jurisdic-
tional dispute between two railroad unions, the NLRB would never
have a covered employer over whom to assert jurisdiction in the
first place. Therefore, these activities would remain within the
exclusive control of the Railway Labor Act.
This answer to the argument seems to beg the fundamental
question involved. The question is whether giving "any" a broad
interpretation for purposes of parts (A) and (B) of section 8(b) (4)
requires a similarly broad interpretation for purposes of part (D)
37 Id. at 1230.
38. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1952)
39. 38 L.R.R.M. at 1235 n. 37
40. The NLRB will assert jurisdiction in a secondary boycott case oil
the basis of the primary employer's activities alone, though the secondary
employers' commerce volume does not meet the Board's current jurisdictional
yardstick. See Local 688, Warehouse Workers Union, AFL-CIO, and Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1506, Lab. Rel. Rep. (38 L.R.R.M. 1110)
(1956).
41. The NLRB will assert jurisdiction in a secondary boycott case on
the basis of the secondary employer's activities alone though the primary
employer's commerce volume does not meet the Board's current jurisdictional
yardstick. See Teamsters Union, Local 554, AFL, and McAllister Transfer,
Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769, Lab. Rel. Rep. (35 L.R.R.M. 1281) (1954)
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The dissent in the Paper Makers case says no, because the NLRB
would not have jurisdiction over situations arising under part (D).
The reason it would not have jurisdiction is that railroads are ex-
cluded from the act. But the problem is whether, in spite of the spe-
cific exclusion, a broad interpretation of "any" will include them for
purposes of part (D), just as it is supposed to include them for
purposes of parts (A) and (B). If it does, then the NLRB would
have jurisdiction. It does not make sense to argue, as the dissent
does, that railroads would not be covered by part (D) because the
NLRB would not have jurisdiction. The Board would lack jurisdic-
tion only if the conclusion that railroads are not covered is first
conceded.
A better refutation of the majority argument in the Paper
Makers case is that a broad interpretation of the word "any em-
ployer," so as to provide protection against secondary boycotts, does
not require that a similarly broad interpretation be given to a pro-
vision that deals with primary employer-employee relations. There
are two justifications for this distinction. First, because the Railway
Labor Act covers the primary relations contemplated by part (D),
adequate regulation is already provided. But no other statute covers
the secondary activity contemplated by parts (A) and (B), so this
is more in need of regulation. Second, there is seemingly more
need to extend the scope of the Taft-Hartley Act to protect a
neutral employer who has no control over the causes of the primary
dispute, than there is to extend it to provide protection to an em-
ployer who is a participant in the dispute and can bargain or resort
to his own economic weapons to bring about a settlement of the
strike. The neutral employer can only accede to the union's de-
mands or remain shut down by the secondary boycott, unless he is
given protection under section 8(b) (4) (A).
(3) Interpretations based on prior judicial construction of the
words-There is still a third technique of arguing from the plain
words of the statute. That is to say that the words have. a certain
established meaning because a court of higher authority has already
said that they have that meaning. This sort of argument %was made
with regard to the instant troublesome words. In Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB,42 the United States Supreme Court held that the
section 2(3) definition of "employees" excluding individuals,
"whose work has ceased as a consequence of any current labor
dispute" and who have obtained "substantially equivalent employ-
42. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
1957] NOTE
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ment" does not control the meaning of the word "employees" as
used in section 10(c) of the act. Therefore, an individual who has
taken substantially equivalent employment may, nevertheless, be
entitled to reinstatement to his old job under the words of sec-
tion 10(c) which provide that "employees" may be reinstated. 43
The argument is that this case holds that the definitions of section
2(3) do not necessarily control the meaning of the defined words
as they appear elsewhere in the act. Therefore "employer" and
"employee" as used in section 8(b) (4) (A) may have a broader
meaning than is ascribed to them by section 2(3) On analysis of
the Phelps Dodge case, however, it is not quite so easy to arrive
at this conclusion.
The holding of the Phelps Dodge case is that the section 2(3)
definition need be applied to the word "employee" when used in
another section of the act only when there is authority to do so
"either in the policy of the Act or in some specific delimiting pro-
vision of it."44 It has been argued that the specific exclusions of
section 2(3) constitute such a specific delimiting provision.4 This
argument is probably not sound, because it was those specific exclu-
sions which the Phelps Dodge case held not to be applicable in the
absence of a specific delimiting provision. Apparently the Supreme
Court was referring to a specific delimiting provision relating back
to section 2(3) in the section being interpreted. Even so, the second
hurdle of the Phelps Dodge case must be overcome, for the sec-
tion 2(3) definition may still apply if there is authority in the policy
of the act for it to do so. In the instant group of cases, one of the
questions is whether the policy of the act requires such an applica-
tion. The policy of the act in regard to this question must be deter-
mined before the applicability of the Phelps Dodge holding can be
decided. Then that holding can be cited as authority to support
whichever reading is given to the words "employer" and "employee"
as used in section 8(b) (4) (A) In short, while the Phelps Dodge
case stands for the proposition that the section 2 definitions are not,
of necessity, controlling throughout the act, it does not resolve the
question whether they control section 8(b) (4) (A)
A more significant and difficult problem is whether the Supreme
Court in the "piggy-back" case made a binding determination of
the meaning of "employer" as it is used in section 8(b) (4) (A) In
the Paper Makers case, the NLRB held that it did not."0 The
43. 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952)
44. 313 U.S. at 191.
45. See the Di Giorgto case, 191 F.2d at 646.
46. 38 L.R.R.M. at 1230, 1232.
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Supreme Court first stated that "since railroads are not excluded
from the Act's definition of 'person' they are entitled to Board pro-
tection from the kind of unfair labor practice proscribed by
§ 8(b) (4) (A) .47 Then the Supreme Court went on to say
"Whether the Act was violated is, of course, a question
for the Board to determine. Even if petitioner's [the union's]
conduct is not prohibited by § 8 of the Act, it may come within
the protection of § 7, in which case the State was not free to
enjoin the conduct."481
The Supreme Court did not decide whether section 8(b) (4) (A)
had been violated, but it did decide that a railroad was a "person"
who could ask the Board to determine if section 8(b) (4) (A) had
been violated in its case; and it did decide that a railroad was a
"person" within section 8(b) (4) (A) and entitled to Board protec-
tion if that section had in fact been violated. When the Paper
Makers case came before the NLRB, it apparently felt bound by the
"piggy-back" decision to assert jurisdiction and to regard a munici-
pal corporation as a "person" within section 8(b) (4) (A) (thus
tacitly overruling the Schneider and Sprys cases)4" just as the
Supreme Court held a railroad vas a "person" within that sec-
tion. But this "person" is entitled to NLRB protection only when
the section has been violated. Since the Supreme Court did not say
a railroad was an "employer" the NLRB felt free to say that the
section had not been violated because a municipal corporation,
though a "person," is not an "employer" and thus inducement of
its employees was not inducement of the "employees of any em-
ployer."
It is true that the Supreme Court did not specifically state that
the railroad was an "employer" as well as a "person." But does the
Supreme Court opinion have any meaning when it is interpreted
as the NLRB interprets it? If the alleged secondary boycott in the
"piggy-back" case was dearly within the proscription of section
8(b) (4) (A) except for the fact that the secondary employer was a
railroad, and if the secondary boycott was carried out through in-
ducement of the railroad's employees, 49 then it seems logical to say
47. 350 U.S. at 160.
48. Id. at 161.
48a. Since this Note was written the NLRB has expressly overruled the
Schneider and Sprys cases on the strength of the "piggy-back" case, to the
extent that they are inconsistent. Local 313, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO and Furness Electric Co. Lab. Rel. Rep. (39
LRRM 1250) (1956) ; see Lab. Rel. Rep. (39 Analysis 73) (1956).
49. The NLRB apparently reads the facts of the "piggy-back" case so
as to find that the secondary inducement was not of the railroads' own em-
ployees. This interpretation enables the Board to circumscribe the "piggy-
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that the Supreme Court must have considered the railroad an
"employer" and the inducement of its workers to be violative of the
section. 49 a If it did not, then it was really saying that the railroad had
a right to file a charge with the NLRB, but that it could never hope
to obtain a remedy It is not logical to interpret the decision as
holding that the NLRB may not refuse to assert jurisdiction on the
ground that the railroad has no right to complain because it is
excluded from the purview of section 8(b) (4) (A), but must assert
jurisdiction only for the purpose of telling the railroad that the act
has no remedy for the complaint since the railroad is excluded
from the purview of section 8(b) (4) (A) If this interpretation is
correct, then the "piggy-back" decision is rendered largely in-
effectual.5"
Furthermore, if the NLRB construction of the "piggy-back"
case is accepted it would mean that secondary boycotts of excluded
employers are illegal when accomplished through inducement of
employees of an admittedly covered employer, as in the Schneider
and Sprys cases, but legal when accomplished through inducement
of the excluded employer's own employees as in the Rice Milling,
"piggy-back," and Paper Makers cases. Perhaps this sort of dis-
tinction can be rationalized on the ground that the Board's only
duty is to protect the covered neutral employer whose employees
are being induced, and that protection of the excluded neutral
employer is merely an incidental consequence of the Board's exer-
cise of its duty to protect the former.
It is unfortunate that the issue, whether the definitions of sec-
tion 2 control the meanings of words in section 8(b) (4) (A), came
before the Supreme Court in such an oblique manner. The case
back" holding. Then the Supreme Court would only have passed on the
question whether a railroad which is forced to cease doing business with any
person as a result of secondary inducement of admittedly covered employees
rather than through inducement of its own employees, may invoke § 8(b)
(4) (A). The Board's assumption that there was no secondary inducement
of the railroads' own employees is probably founded on the Supreme Court's
statement that the union had not "interfered in any manner whatsoever with
the railroad's employees." See 350 U.S. at 160. But this language, read in
context, seems clearly to be referring to interference with the primary rela-
tions of railroad's employees and the railroad, rather than to secondary in-
ducement of the railroad's employees. Indeed the facts indicate that there was
secondary inducement of the railroad's employees
"Employees of [the railroad] were persuaded by (business agents
of the union] not to load previously delivered trailers onto
flatcars." Id. at 157
49a. Since this Note was written, a federal district court has held a
federal government agency to be "any employer" within section 8(b) (4) (A),
citing the "piggy-back" case. Douds v. Seafarer's Union, 39 LRRM 2537
(E.D.N.Y. 1957).
50. The dissenting opinion in the Paper Makers case finds the "piggy-
back" case applicable on other grounds. See 38 L.R.R.M. at 1234.
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was never before the NLRB and apparently the Supreme Court
did not consider any of the NLRB or circuit court cases in point in
making its ruling. The ruling on a question of jurisdiction rather
than on the precise issue, the only partial disposal of the issue by
express holding, and the extremely general wording in this case,
leave it open to several interpretations. Like the Phelps Dodge case,
it can be cited to support either point of view.
The simple truth is that the words of the statute are not plain.
If they were, the instant body of case law would not have arisen,
and as of this.time, the decisions of the NLRB and the courts have
not rendered their meaning clear. What the words "employer" and
"employee," as used in section 8(b) (4) (A), mean depends on
what Congress intended them to mean. Perhaps this can be deter-
mined by looking at the legislative history of the statute.
B. Argunents from the legislative history of the statute:
Proponents of either point of view on the problem at hand have
done a great deal of talking about congressional intent as to the
applicability of the section 2(2) and (3) definitions to section
8(b) (4) (A)."- But no one has quoted words from the Congres-
sional Record or from committee reports which deal with the specific
problem.5 2 All the discussion in these documents which deals with
the intended effect of section 8(b) (4) (A) is confined to considera-
tion of included employers.5 3 There is no mention of secondary boy-
cotts against railroads or government agencies.
There is discussion which deals with the effect of secondary
boycotts on farmers.5" But here it is contemplated that the union
involved will be a covered "labor organization" and that the sec-
ondary inducement will be of the admittedly covered employees of a
covered employer with an object of forcing the covered employer to
cease doing business with the farmer. When the object of the induce-
ment is to force "any employer or other person" to cease doing
business with "any other person," there is an illegal secondary
boycott..The farmer has always been considered "any other person"
for tis purpose.5 However, this legislative history does not indicate
51. Compare the Schneider case, 89 N.L.R.B. at 223, with the Rice
Milling case, 183 F.2d at 25, 26.
52. Very recently, the problem was placed before Congress in the form
of an explanatory statement accompanying a proposed amendment to the Taft-
Hartley Act. See 102 Cong. Rec. 7191-92 (daily ed. May 7, 1956). No action
has yet been taken on this proposed amendment.
53. This is recognized by the NLRB in the Schneider case. See 89
N.L.R.B. at 225 n. 15.
54. See 93 Cong. Rec. 3424, 3432 (1947).
55. See Hawiaii Teamsters Union, Local 996, and Waaalua Dairy,
111 N.LthB. 1220 (1955).
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whether or not Congress intended that the proscriltion of section
8(b) (4) (A) should apply to a union which does not qualify as a
"labor organization" under section 2(5) There is no indication
whether or not the section 2(5) definition is meant to carry over to
section 8(b) (4) (A) Therefore, the legislative history of secondary
boycotts against farmers does not help to solve the problem of the
Dz Giorgio case.
When it is argued, for example, that it was the intent of Con-
gress to exclude railroads from the protection of section 8(b) (4) (A)
when they are neutral secondary parties to a primary labor dispute,
the argument is based on the general exclusion in section 2(2)
and (3) and on the legislative history justifying that general exclu-
sion. The same is true of arguments which state that the legislative
history indicates that government agencies are to be excluded from
section 8(b) (4) (A) protection and that agricultural laborers'
unions cannot violate that section. The legislative history of these
exclusions does not relate to the effect the exclusion will have
on the secondary boycott provision. These supposed arguments
from legislative history are really only being used to lay down a
hypothesis from which to make a policy argument. The hypothesis
is that Congress intended to exclude these parties so far as their
primary relations are concerned. The policy argument is that a
similar congressional intent to exclude these parties from secondary
boycott regulation should be inferred from the congressional treat-
ment of the primary relations of the parties. Since neither the plain
words of the statute nor its legislative history directly answer the
instant question, it is necessary to resort to these considerations of
policy to answer it, as the NLRB and the courts have done. But
for the sake of clarity, these arguments should be identified as
policy arguments and not confused with arguments as to the specific
legislative history of the section involved. The question now be-
comes, what effect could Congress most reasonably be supposed to
have intended if it had specifically considered the question involved.
That is, what is good policy '
C. Arguments as to policy-
It is reasonably clear that the purpose of excluding railroads,
agricultural laborers, and governments from the definitions of sec-
tion 2(2) and (3) was to insulate the primary relations of these
employers and employees from the regulatory scope of the Taft-
Hartley Act. In the case of railroads, adequate regulation was
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already provided by the Railway Labor Act.50 In the case of
farmers, it has been suggested that Congress felt it unnecessary for
the federal government to act as an intermediary between employer
and employees since most farm operations are relatively small and
the parties do not need government help to get together for eco-
nomic bargaining. 57 In the case of government, it was apparently felt
that there was danger of labor's obstructing vital public functions by
asserting the rights which the act guarantees.58
It is perfectly clear that section 8(b) (4) (A) was meant only
to deal with secondary boycotts and not with the primary relations
of an employer and his employees. This is well illustrated by the
words of Senator Taft, the act's co-author"
"This provision [section 8(b) (4) (A)] makes it unlawful
to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the business of a
third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement
between an employer and his employees. All this provision
of the bill does is to reverse the effect of the law as to secondary
boycotts." (Emphasis added.) 59
The case law supports this interpretation unqualifiedly 1o
A third proposition is also relatively clear. Section 8(b) (4) (A)
was intended to make all secondary boycotts unfair labor practices
without distinguishing one type from another. Again in the words of
Senator Taft:
"It has been set forth that there are good secondary boycotts
and bad secondary boycotts. Our committee heard evidence for
weeks and never succeeded in having anyone tell us any differ'-
ence between different kinds of secondary boycotts. So we have
so broadened the provision dealing with secondary boycotts as
to make them an unfair labor practice."'
If the purpose of the exclusionary provision is to insulate certain
primary relations from regulation, and if the purpose of section
8(b) (4) (A) is to regulate secondary boycotts only, but to regulate
all of them, it would then seem that there would be no offense to the
56. See the trial examiner's intermediate report in the Rice Milling case,
84 N.L.R.B. at 373, and authorities cited there.
57. North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn. v. NLRB, 109 F2d 76, 80
(9th Cir.), cert. detied, 310 U.S. 632 (1940).
58. See 93 Cong. Rec. 6858, Nutter v. Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d
292, 297-98, 168 P2d 741, 745 (1946), 53 Colum. L. Rev. 1021, 1023 (1953).
59. 93 Cong. Rec. 4198 (1947).
60. Even if the primary picketing incidentally affects secondary em-
ployers, there is no violation of § 8(b) (4) (A). The leading case is the United
States Supreme Court decision in the Rice Milling case, wluch was appealed
from the Fifth Circuit on this issue rather than the one discussed in the text.
See 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
61. 93 Cong. Rec. 4198 (1947).
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exclusionary provision to place the excluded parties within the scope
of the secondary boycott provision. While the words of the act and its
legislative history do not demand this interpretation, neither do
they prevent it. It does not follow from this interpretation that the
excluded parties must be included within the regulatory scope of
the act for any other purpose than to prevent secondary boycotts.
This treatment would eliminate several inconsistencies that the
NLRB interpretation creates. First, a union would not be able
to circumvent section 8(b) (4) (A) by picking an excluded em-
ployer to exert secondary pressure against, thus exerting what
would otherwise be illegal pressure on the primary employer.
Second, covered neutral employers, whose employees are induced
to strike with an object of forcing an excluded neutral employer to
cease doing business with the primary employer, would be given
the same protection that they would receive if the object of the
inducement were to force another covered neutral employer to cease
doing business with the primary employer. Third, all labor disputes
would be localized and could not be extended so as to have a
multiplier effect in impeding commerce, thus the general public
would benefit.62 Fourth, this interpretation would eliminate "Alice
in Wonderland" situations like that in the Dt Giorgio case, where
the covered union which responded to the secondary boycott was
found to have violated section 8(b) (4) (A) while the non-covered
union which instigated it was not.
CONCLUSION
The proper test is simply to ask whether the effect of the union's
activity is to extend the primary dispute beyond the primary em-
ployer so as to exert pressure on neutral employers and employees
who are not parties to that dispute. If so, then section 8(b) (4) (A)
should be applied to restrain the activity and localize it to the inter-
ested parties. The words of the statute can just as well be read to
allow this result as to prevent it. The result does not conflict with
the Supreme Court decisions on the question. Indeed, some read
these decisions to require it. There is no legislative history indicat-
ing that the act was not intended to be interpreted in this way This
interpretation provides consistent treatment for all parties in all
secondary boycott situations, as the legislative history indicates
Congress intended. The ultimate effect of this interpretation is to
insure the free flow of commerce which is a fundamental goal of
the Taft-Hartley Act.
62. This is one of the prime objectives of the act. See 61 Stat. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1952)
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